Merger control developments in Brazil: August-December 2025

Brazil’s Antitrust Authority redefines filing parameters for codeshare agreements

On September 3, 2025, the Tribunal at the Brazilian Antitrust Authority (CADE) ruled on an administrative proceeding (APAC No. 08700.003565/2024-49) that examined the May 2024 codeshare agreement between the Brazilian airlines Azul and Gol. The ruling was significant in assessing whether codeshare agreements should be subject to mandatory antitrust filing with the authority, as well as in establishing the tribunal’s interpretation of whether CADE has the prerogative to review mergers that are not subject to mandatory filing.  

Regarding whether codeshare agreements would be subject to mandatory notification, CADE analyzed whether the existing agreement between Azul and Gol constituted an “associative agreement” under Resolution No. 17/2016. Under the Azul-Gol agreement, which was executed for an indefinite term, the companies would share flight codes and jointly market non-overlapping routes, as well as integrate their respective loyalty programs. In the airlines’ view, the agreement would not qualify as an ‘associative agreement’ as it met only two of the four criteria to be classified as such – a term exceeding two years, and competition between the parties in the relevant market – and therefore, it would not be subject to mandatory filing with CADE.  

Upon becoming aware of the agreement through a complaint, CADE’s General Superintendence (GS) considered it to be an associative agreement and opened a gun jumping probe. However, the GS eventually closed the proceeding, noting that, as the agreement had been in effect for less than two years and had not been fully implemented, the competitive conditions between the companies had been duly preserved, thus ruling out a conviction for gun jumping. The GS took the view that the parties would only be obligated to file the agreement after it had been effective for two years (and only if the parties wished to renew it – in which case the agreement would have to be filed prior to the renewal). CADE’s Tribunal then called in the case  to clarify the criteria and the point at which agreements of this nature are considered consummated.  

At CADE’s Tribunal, Reporting Commissioner Carlos Jacques Vieira Gomes took the stance that the Azul-Gol agreement qualified as an “associative agreement” under Resolution No. 17/2016. In line with the GS’s view, he considered the agreement to amount to a joint undertaking due to both parties’ performing the roles of marketing carrier and operating carrier, as well as converging commercial objectives, shared use of assets and infrastructure, and the interdependence of the partnership’s economic outcomes. Commissioner Gomes also noted the parties would share risks related to the agreement, particularly in light of joint and several liability between the flight operator and marketer under Brazilian consumer law.  

Although he viewed it as an associative agreement, Commissioner Gomes concurred with the GS that the Azul-Gol arrangement was not subject to mandatory filing at the time of review because CADE Resolution No. 17/2016 provides that associative agreements with an indefinite term must only be notified after being effective for two years. Nonetheless, Commissioner Gomes determined the Azul-Gol agreement should be submitted to CADE for review based on an expansive interpretation of Article 88, Paragraph 7 of the Brazilian Competition Law (Law No. 12,529/2011). Literally read, this provision only grants CADE the prerogative to require the filing of mergers that do not meet the turnover thresholds under Article 88. In his decision, however, Commissioner Gomes read Paragraph 7 as allowing CADE to require the submission of mergers that do not meet the requirements of Article 88 or Article 90, the latter of which defines what constitutes a reportable merger. As per this reading, CADE would have the power to require parties to submit transactions that do not even qualify as reportable mergers. The commissioner ultimately took the view that “any and all transactions between economic agents could be subject to CADE’s review through the application of Article 88, Paragraph 7.”  

As such, even though the Azul-Gol agreement did not constitute an associative agreement subject to mandatory filing (and, consequently, did not result in gun jumping penalties for the parties), Commissioner Gomes held that it should be submitted to CADE under the terms of Article 88, Paragraph 7, considering the highly concentrated nature of the market involved (and the fact that the transaction involved two of its three main players) and the public interest inherent to the codeshare at issue. The other commissioners at CADE’s Tribunal unanimously agreed with Commissioner Gomes, and recommended that codeshare agreements between domestic airlines be reviewed by CADE, either at the parties’ behest or through the statutory mechanism.  

This case serves as a cautionary tale for market participants for two main reasons. Firstly, it clarifies the mandatory filing criteria for codeshare and associative agreements (particularly in regard to when filing must occur). Secondly, it signals the current tribunal’s inclination to use Article 88, Paragraph 7 to call in non-notifiable transactions – even those that may not constitute reportable mergers – particularly in sectors with heightened competitive sensitivity, such as air transportation.  

Points of attention in the BRF-Marfrig transaction 

Marfrig’s incorporation of BRF (Merger Filing No. 08700.005409/2025-01) is among the more noteworthy complex transactions CADE recently reviewed. Cleared by the Tribunal without restrictions on September 5, 2025, the transaction combined two of Brazil’s largest animal protein business groups, sparking discussions about buyer power, market concentration, and risks associated with cross-ownership to the fore. The case drew attention not only because of the size of the companies involved, but also due to concerns raised by third parties (such as Minerva Foods), which questioned potential coordinated effects stemming from the Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company’s (SALIC) stake in both Marfrig and Minerva. Additionally, BRF’s historically strong position in the processed foods market (especially in food service) prompted greater scrutiny from the authorities.  

Filed with CADE on May 23, 2025, the transaction consisted of Marfrig acquiring all BRF shares not already under its control, thereby definitively integrating BRF into the Marfrig group. The GS submitted an opinion recommending clearance without restrictions, concluding there were minimal competitive risks due to the limited combined market share in the relevant markets.  

However, the case became more complex when Minerva sought standing as an interested third party. In appealing the GS’s decision to clear without restrictions, among other issues, Minerva raised the possibility of coordinated effects stemming from SALIC’s equity stake in both Marfrig and Minerva. In Minerva’s view, this structure could create incentives for alignment between the competitors and even interlocking directorates, whereby shared board members or access to sensitive strategic information could undermine competition. Minerva also questioned whether the GS’s summary review was sufficient, advocating for a more in-depth investigation.  

Reporting Commissioner and CADE President Gustavo Augusto admitted Minerva’s appeal and emphasized that SALIC’s equity stake in the companies involved had not been properly considered in the technical analysis. While he noted that SALIC converted its common shares into derivatives after the trial began (neutralizing its political rights in BRF and dispelling immediate competitive concerns), given the possibility that SALIC could dispose of the derivatives and exercise an option to purchase BRF shares at any time, Commissioner Augusto determined that SALIC could only exercise any political rights after submitting a new filing to CADE. He therefore upheld the GS’s decision to clear the transaction without restrictions, emphasizing that SALIC and the Salic International Investment Company (SIIC) would not be authorized to exercise any political rights in the post-transaction entity until that matter was filed with and cleared by CADE.  

In turn, Commissioner Victor Fernandes believed Minerva’s appeal should not be admitted, as he believed the GS had adequately addressed all substantive issues. The potential for cross-ownership by SIIC and SALIC was dismissed, both because the formation of such holdings was a future, uncertain event that would be subject to new filings with CADE, and because the GS had already reviewed and cleared SALIC to acquire 11.03% of BRF in Merger Filing No. 08700.005720/2023-81, at which time it examined the alleged interlocking directorates involving SALIC’s presence on the boards of Minerva and BRF (controlled by Marfrig). At that time, the GS concluded that any interlocking would not raise competitive concerns due to mechanisms preventing the exchange of sensitive information, the financial nature of SALIC’s investment in BRF, and BRF’s bylaws prohibiting participation and voting in conflict-of-interest situations. Accordingly, Commissioner Victor Fernandes voted to reject the appeal and clear the transaction without restrictions.  

The majority of CADE’s Tribunal ultimately voted in line with Commissioner Victor Fernandes to reject Minerva’s appeal and unanimously uphold the GS’s clearance without restrictions on the merits. Notably, the decision demonstrates how CADE calibrates control of highly complex structures in concentrated sectors, particularly amid interlocking directorates and potential coordinated effects. Even though traditional indicators of horizontal overlap and vertical integration suggested limited risks in this case, the third party’s involvement led to closer scrutiny of governance, political rights, interlocking directorates, and information firewalls. For both companies and investors, the decision offers a practical roadmap for mitigating competitive risks when structuring deals, underscoring the importance of mapping crossholdings, building governance safeguards from the outset, and anticipating third-party interventions to ensure predictability, reduce procedural uncertainty, and preserve transaction value.  

Gun jumping in the Mitsui-MODEC cases 

On September 3, 2025, CADE’s Tribunal reviewed two distinct transactions involving the same companies – Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui), Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL), Marine Projects Investment (MPIC), and Modec Holdings Netherlands (MHNL) – relating to the acquisition of equity stakes in floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) projects. Both transactions were consummated without being filed with CADE beforehand, and amounted to gun-jumping violations.  

The first transaction (APAC No. 08700.002557/2024-85) involved Mitsui, MOL, and MPIC acquiring stakes in Marlim1 MV33 B.V. (MV33 – originally held by Modec, Inc.) to finance the deployment of the FPSO Anita Garibaldi MV33. The transaction closed in 2020, yet was only filed with CADE in 2024. The second transaction (APAC No. 08700.002559/2024-74) involved the same companies and consisted of the acquisition of stakes in Búzios5 MV32 B.V. (MV32 – the entity responsible for the FPSO Almirante Barroso) under a shareholders’ agreement executed in November 2019. This transaction was voluntarily filed with CADE only in March 2024.  

In both cases, the companies put forward the same justification for not filing the transactions with CADE, arguing the investments were purely financial and did not lead to any active role within the management of MV33 and MV32. However, the GS concluded that the acquisition of a significant equity stake, even within an investment structure (e.g., project finance), constitutes a reportable merger if it meets the legal criteria – with the Brazilian Competition Law’s Article 90, Item II (acquisition of shares) or Item IV (formation of a joint venture) encompassing both transactions. Even if this were not the case, the GS held that the acquiring companies would play a role beyond that of mere creditors after it analyzed the respective shareholder agreements between the parties. 

As a subsidiary argument, the companies claimed that the transactions met an exemption for filing in Article 90, Sole Paragraph of the Brazilian Competition Law, which removes the obligation to file with CADE associative agreements, consortia, or joint ventures formed exclusively to participate in public tenders (and the contracts arising from them). After analyzing the timeline of the first transaction (APAC No. 08700.002557/2024-85), Reporting Commissioner Diogo Thomson  confirmed the GS’s view that Article 90 did not apply, as contrary to the companies’ claims, the transaction was not tied to a Petrobras tender won by MV33. In fact, the acquiring companies did not form a joint venture to participate in the tender – MV33 participated by itself, with Mitsui, MOL, and MPIC only acquiring stakes in its capital later on.  

Similarly, the rapporteur in the second transaction (APAC No. 08700.002559/2024-74), Commissioner Camila Pires Alves, concluded that the transaction was not linked to Petrobras’ tender, noting that the transaction documents did not refer to forming a joint venture for the bidding process. She further emphasized, in line with the GS, that acquiring shares in a tender-winning company is not a contract arising from the tender, but rather a private decision; therefore, it does not fall within the legal exemption. 

In both cases, CADE’s Tribunal found that the transactions met the conditions for filing as provided for in Article 90 of the Brazilian Competition Law and that, as the groups involved met the turnover thresholds at the time of implementation, they had committed gun-jumping violations.  

The Tribunal’s conclusions in both cases should make investors and operators in infrastructure and oil and gas projects more wary of gun-jumping risks in project finance structures and in stakes acquired in FPSO vehicles. Acquisitions of significant equity interests (even when framed as ‘financial’ investments with limited governance) may constitute mergers requiring prior filing with the authority if they meet the formal and objective filing criteria for minority acquisitions, which do not require any qualification regarding the nature of the investment. CADE’s Tribunal also clarified the limits of the exemption provided for in the sole paragraph of Article 90, stating it does not encompass acquisitions of shareholdings in a company that has already won a public tender.  

Unilateral remedies debated in Ultragaz-Supergasbras joint venture 

On August 20, 2025, CADE’s Tribunal cleared a greenfield joint venture (Merger Filing No. 08700.009855/2024-04) without restrictions between Ultragaz and Supergasbras to build, develop, and operate a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) port terminal at the Port of Pecém in northeastern Brazil. Significantly, this ruling has deepened the understanding of the structures and content of unilateral remedies that CADE deems sufficient and acceptable for mitigating competitive concerns.  

Although the GS initially cleared the transaction without restrictions, it reached CADE’s Tribunal after an appeal by a third-party complainant in the case, Queiroz Participações S.A. (GEQ – the holding company of Grupo Edson Queiroz). GEQ argued that with the nearby Mucuripe terminal becoming decommissioned, the Pecém terminal would become the main entry point for LPG in the state of Ceará, making several aspects more critical – including exclusivity and take-or-pay clauses that could favor the parties, the risk of foreclosure, the absence of guarantees for cabotage, and the insufficiency of governance mechanisms. As GEQ argued that, without adequate safeguards, the transaction could reduce market contestability, increase rivals’ costs, and harm end consumers.  

Reporting Commissioner Gustavo Augusto admitted the appeal, only to deny it on the merits. While acknowledging the inherent competitive risks – particularly those regarding competitors’ access to and their use of the terminal, the risk of discriminatory treatment that could raise rivals’ costs and exclude them from the market, and the risk of exercise of coordinated market power by the parties through the joint venture – he found these risks were mitigated both as a result of the Brazilian Waterway Transportation Agency (ANTAQ) and the Brazilian Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency’s (ANP) sectoral regulations, as well as the contractual instruments between the parties.  

Chief among these instruments was the shareholders’ agreement, which provided for the joint venture to be managed independently of its shareholders, with clear and objective governance rules, the restricted access by one party to the other’s commercially sensitive information, and functional segregation mechanisms. The GS and Commissioner Augusto concluded that the contractual framework offered adequate mechanisms to mitigate informational foreclosure and structural abuse risks.  

Because the factors mitigating the identified antitrust risks were embedded in contractual instruments with effects between the parties, Commissioner Augusto determined that the clauses should be incorporated into CADE’s decision to provide transparency in regard to the remedies and to also guarantee third-party rights, thereby making the remedies more effective.  

Commissioner Victor Fernandes concurred, observing that clearances with restrictions should be justified only when they impose constraints that the parties themselves have not originally provided. If companies have already provided adequate safeguards, the authority must factor in monitoring costs when setting additional remedies. In the present case, sectoral regulations and the detailed guarantees in the existing contractual instruments suggested that clearing the transaction with restrictions was unnecessary.  

The Tribunal unanimously admitted and cleared the transaction without restrictions, subject to the clearance conditions set out in the vote of the Reporting Commissioner and CADE’s President Gustavo Augusto.  

Petz-Cobasi merger approved with restrictions 

In a decision issued on December 10, 2025, CADE’s Tribunal approved (subject to restrictions), by majority of votes, a merger between two of Brazil’s largest specialized retail pet product and service groups, Petz and Cobasi (Merger Filing No. 08700.009264/2024-29). As a result, the parties entered into a Merger Control Agreement (MCA) with CADE, which provided for both structural and behavioral remedies. 

Although the transaction was initially cleared without restrictions by the GS, it reached CADE’s Tribunal following an appeal filed by Petlove, which, as a direct competitor of both Petz and Cobasi in digital retail, had been admitted as an interested third party in the case. According to Petlove, the transaction was underpinned by an anticompetitive rationale and would produce harmful effects on competition in Brazil’s market for pet products and services. 

Notably, while CADE’s Tribunal reviewed the transaction, it issued information requests to the parties’ competitors and suppliers to obtain further input, and a public hearing was also held to discuss competition-related aspects of the pet market with society at large. 

Reporting Commissioner José Levi found that the ACC the parties entered into with CADE  would be capable of ensuring adequate competitive conditions in the brick-and-mortar pet store market, which, in his words, would be “more competitive than the current scenario” under the ACC. The ACC would involve the divestiture of 26 stores located in the state of São Paulo – a decisive measure to mitigate the competitive concerns identified in the context of the transaction – as well as certain behavioral remedies. As reported in an interview with Presiding Commissioner Gustavo Augusto, the remedies included prohibiting exclusivity in relation to supplier contracts, most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses in formal agreements, and the practice of boosting paid online ads that redirect their own traffic to competing brands. 

The Reporting Commissioner’s view was supported by a 5-1 majority at CADE’s Tribunal, leading to the transaction being approved subject to the execution of an ACC. Commissioner Camila Cabral Pires Alves issued a dissenting opinion, stating that, despite the agreed-upon remedies, there would still be “a significant number of markets with problems.” According to the commissioner, the transaction was one of the most complex in Brazil’s retail sector in the past two years. 

For more information on these topics, please contact Mattos Filho’s Antitrust practice area.